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This article addresses the relationship between international law and religion. The author
considers the different aspects of this relationship in a time where a resurgence of religion, and
with it new perspectives on international human rights, has sought to change the terms of the
debate. The article explores the different models that seek to conceptualise the relationship
between religion and international law; in doing so, the author critically analyses the
current climate from an historical perspective and from a spectrum of different theoretical
perspectives. The author offers a narration of the ongoing interaction of religion and
international law, whilst offering his analysis of how that interaction can be acknowledged
and promoted whilst being used to harmonise areas of international tension, and further the
development of human rights.
Introduction
Modern international law is generally perceived as a secular international legal system
but the debate about its relationship with religion is an old and ongoing one. The
current global surge of religion and its interaction with different aspects of international
law have made the debate more relevant than ever. The specific question of whether
religion and international law should be regarded as friends or foes is not only relevant
to current debates on the maintenance of international peace and security but also to
the promotion and protection of international human rights across the different cultures
and civilisations of the world.
In his 43rd Hobhouse Memorial Lecture titled ‘‘The Return of the Sacred? The
Argument on the Future of Religion’’ published in 1977, the renowned Harvard
Professor of Sociology, Daniel Bell, observed that:
‘‘At the end of the eighteenth to the middle of the nineteenth century, almost every
Enlightened thinker expected religion to disappear in the twentieth century . . .
From the end of the nineteenth century to the middle twentieth century, almost
every sociological thinker . . . expected religion to disappear by the onset of the
twenty-first century.’’1
* This paper was an inaugural lecture delivered by the author at the School of Law, SOAS,
University of London on February 18, 2009.
1 D. Bell, ‘‘The Return of the Sacred? The Argument on the Future of Religion’’ (1977) 28 British
Journal of Sociology 419, 420 and 421–422.
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However, Daniel Bell predicted (perhaps controversially then) a future resurgence of
religion despite the powerful trend of secularisation at the time. Since then, there have
been many scholarly contributions examining the increased interaction of religion with
different aspects of public life globally. One of the recent additions to such scholarship
is a volume edited by Graham Ward and Michael Hoelzl titled The New Visibility of
Religion, on the back cover of which the editors observed that:
‘‘Since the late 1980s sociologists have beendrawingour attention to an international
surge in the public visibility of religion. This has increasingly challenged two
central aspects of modern western European culture: first, the assumption that
as we became more modern we would become more secularised and religion
would disappear; and secondly, that religion and politics should occupy radically
differentiated spheres in which private conviction did not exert itself within the
public realm. The new visibility of religion is not simply a matter of what Keppel
famously called ‘The Revenge of God’, that is, the resurgence of Christian, Islamic
and Jewish fundamentalism. [Rather], Religion is permeating western culture in
many different forms from contemporary continental philosophy, the arts and the
media, to the rhetoric of international politicians.’’2
This international surge in the public visibility of religion is conceptualised by Hoelzl
and Ward with reference to two models, namely, a ‘‘re-emergence model’’ and a ‘‘new
visibility model’’.3 The re-emergence model represents the surge in terms of religion
remanifesting itself after a period of decline,4 while the new visibility model represents
the surge in terms of a new visibility of religion ‘‘that is far more complex and nuanced
than a simple re-emergence of something that has been in decline in the past’’.5 Thus,
a relevant preliminary question would be: through which of these two models can we
possibly represent the current relationship between religion and international law? Are
we experiencing a ‘‘re-emergence’’ of religion in international law or a ‘‘new visibility’’
of religion in international law? Is it a combination of both? Or none of the above?
In this author’s view, religion has never been completely exiled from international
law, but has always been part of the international law venture. Indeed, religion has
played, and continues to play, a significant role in the evolution of international law
even though the relationship is often perceived to be complex and controversial for
different reasons. On the one hand, the controversy surrounding the relationship may
be attributed to the apparent differences in the nature of religion (sacred) and that of
international law (secular). Carolyn Evans has noted that ‘‘[t]he place of religion in the
international legal system, or indeed any legal system that purports to be secular, is likely
2 G. Ward and M Hoelzl (eds), The New Visibility of Religion: Studies in Religion and Cultural
Hermeneutics (London: Continuum, 2008).
3 See M. Hoelzl and G. Ward, ‘‘Introduction’’ in Ward and Hoelzl (eds), The New Visibility of
Religion (2008), pp.1–11 at p.1.
4 This model is reflected largely in works such as F. Petito and P. Hatzopoulos (eds) Religion
in International Relations: The Return from Exile (New York: Palgrave, 2003).
5 Hoelzl and Ward, ‘‘Introduction’’ (2008), p.1. This model is reflected largely in works such
as Ward and Hoelzl (eds), The New Visibility of Religion (2008).
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to be controversial and complex’’.6 On the other hand, religion and international law are
identical in otherways.Generally, both religion and laware important social phenomena
that relate respectively to fundamental social issues in human society, which have often
stimulated ‘‘passionate disagreement about their proper content and functions’’.7 Both
can be seen as systems of social ordering, as ethical or normative regimes, or semi-
autonomous social fields. Also, both religion and international law can be politicised
and manipulated by elites, which adds further to the complexity of their relationship.
Owing to this complexity, the relationship between religion and international law
can be analysed from different perspectives depending on one’s objective. This article
will give general but contextualised critical analysis of this relationship from four main
perspectives: historical, theoretical, empirical and doctrinal. These four perspectives are
inter-related, not mutually exclusive. For example, the theoretical perspective must, as
a matter of necessity, not only be historically aware, but empirically meaningful and
also doctrinally relevant. From the historical perspective this article will analyse how
religion has featured in the evolution of international law over time and its consequences
for modern international law. From the theoretical perspective the article will analyse
what may be identified as the main theoretical viewpoints on whether or not religion
ought to have any normative role in international law at all. From the empirical and
doctrinal perspectives the article will examine the practical levels and the legal scope
of the relationship respectively. The term ‘‘religion’’8 is used here in a general sense,
but references will be made to specific religions for the purpose of contextualising and
illustrating the arguments.
Historical perspective
Francis Boyle has noted that ‘‘the truth of international relations [and of international
law] could be found only in the details of history’’.9 The history of international law is
usuallydelineatedby thePeace ofWestphalia,which is oftendepicted as the beginningof
modern international law and international relations, and thus conventionally divided
into the pre-Westphalian and post-Westphalian periods. This traditional division is
essentially Euro-Christian in nature and has been described as being ‘‘to a certain
extent, old fashioned’’.10 The important point, nevertheless, is that in the delineation of
6 See, e.g. C. Evans, ‘‘The Double-Edged Sword: Religious Influences on International
Humanitarian Law’’ (2005) 6 Melbourne Journal of International Law 1, 3.
7 S.D. Jamar, ‘‘Religion and International Law’’ (2001) 16 Journal of Law and Religion 609, where
he observes eloquently that: ‘‘Religion is like law: the more closely we try to define it, the more
it slips through our grasp. Religion is like law: both address fundamental issues about ordering
society and the status and nature of the individual within it. Religion is like law: both engender
passionate disagreement about their proper content and functions.’’
8 For an analysis of the complexity of defining religion in international law, see, e.g. T.J. Gunn,
‘‘The Complexity of Religion and the Definition of ‘Religion’ in International Law’’ (2003) 16
Harvard Human Rights Journal 189.
9 F.A. Boyle,Foundations of World Order: The Legalist Approach to International Relations 1898–1922
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1999), p.1.
10 See H. Steiger, ‘‘From the International Law of Christianity to the International Law of the
World Citizen: Reflections on the Formation of the Epochs of the History of International Law’’
(2001) 3 Journal of the History of International Law 180.
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the pre and post-Westphalian periods, religion remains a germane part of the venture
of international law.
Before the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, religion constituted a fundamental basis for
the normative rules regulating the relationship between the political powers of that
period in different parts of the world.11 For example, the earlier writings on rules of the
law of nations by jurists in Europe relied heavily on Judeo-Christian religious sources,
and similar writings by the early jurists in the Muslim world relied mainly on Islamic
religious sources.12 Although some 19th century international law jurists such as James
Lorimer13 andHenryWheaton14 held the view that the earlier practices of non-European
and non-Christian peoples did not form part of the heritage of international law, this
author is of the view, with other scholars, that the universal history of international law
is short-served without reference to earlier relevant practices of other civilisations other
than the Euro-Christian civilisation.15
After Westphalia, international law materialised as an essentially secular and
European construct but remainedverymuch influencedbyChristian religiousdictates.16
Heinhard Steiger has observed in that regard that the epoch of international law from
the 13th to the 18th century was an epoch of ‘‘international law of Christianity’’17 with
the law deeply rooted in religious principles. He noted that ‘‘Christianity formed the
major intellectual foundation of legal order for the entire epoch’’, which, inter alia,
‘‘brought Europe together, not only into an intellectual-religious unit, but also under the
political idea of res publica Christiana’’, a term he identified as still ‘‘used in treaties as late
as the 18th Century’’.18 Writing from an Islamic perspective, Muhammad Hamidullah
had earlier made a similar observation in 1941, stating that what passed as international
law in Europe up to the mid-19th century was ‘‘a mere public law of Christian nations’’
and noted that it was ‘‘in 1856 that for the first time a non-Christian nation, Turkey,
was considered fit to benefit from the European Public Law of Nations, and this was the
true beginning in internationalising the public law of Christian nations’’.19 To highlight
however that the concept of international law was not limited to the Euro-Christian
11 See, e.g. I. Bantekas, ‘‘Religion as a Source of International Law’’ in J. Rehman and S.C. Breau
(eds), Religion, Human Rights and International Law (The Hague: Brill, 2007), pp.115–135 at p.115;
D.J. Bederman, ‘‘Religion and the Sources of International Law in Antiquity’’ in M. Janis and C.
Evans (eds), Religion and International Law (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004), pp.1–25.
12 See, e.g. M. Khadduri, The Islamic Law on Nations. Shaybani’s Siyar (Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1966).
13 See, e.g. J. Lorimer, The Institutes of the Law of Nations: A Treatise of the Jural Relations of
Separate Political Communities (1883), Vol.1, pp.12–13.
14 See, e.g. H. Wheaton, Elements of International Law (1866), pp.17–18.
15 See also A. Orakhelashvili, ‘‘The Idea of European International Law’’ (2006) 17 E.J.I.L. 315,
particularly 328 et seq.
16 See Peace Treaty of Westphalia of October 24, 1648, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th century/
westphal.asp [Accessed August 25, 2009].
17 Steiger, ‘‘From the International Law of Christianity to the International Law of the World
Citizen’’ (2001) 3 Journal of the History of International Law 180, 183.
18 Steiger, ‘‘From the International Law of Christianity to the International Law of the World
Citizen’’ (2001) 3 Journal of the History of International Law 180, 184.
19 M. Hamidullah, The Muslim Conduct of State, 7th rev edn (Lahore: Sh, Muhammad Ashraf,
1977), p.vii (emphasis in original text).
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civilisation in those times, Hamidullah further observed that international law existed
long before then within Islamic law, based principally on Islamic religious sources.20
There have also been observations by other scholars highlighting the existence in other
religions, such as Judaism, Hinduism and Jainism, of relevant rules for the regulation
of the ‘‘inter-state’’ relationships between political powers in the form of law of nations
prior to the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.21
Over time afterWestphalia, emphasis on the substantive role and influence of religion
in international law declined gradually in Europe, until modern international law
becameperceived strictly as a secularpositivist legal systemwith its foundation regarded
as lying ‘‘firmly in the development of Western culture and political organisation’’.22 In
relation to this, Carolyn Evans refers to Mark Janis’ observation that,
‘‘by 1905, when Oppenheim published his classic International Law, religion no
longer played the important role that it had in earlier texts: rather religion was part
of the history of international law, something that once had mattered’’.23
It must be noted however that it was religious pluralism rather than secularism per se
thatwas initially at the centre of the neworder afterWestphalia. The Peace ofWestphalia
really constituted the triumph of denominationalism against the dominance of the Holy
Roman Empire. The emergence of the pluralist state order was premised upon the idea
that each dominion would have its own creed; it just happened that Protestantism was
peculiarly well suited to the advancement of a secular public order. That is, if we all
have direct access to God, there is no need for religious intermediation by the state.24
The adoption of the United Nations Charter in 1945 can be described as the climax
in the formal substantive secularisation and positivisation of modern international law,
as none of its provisions refer directly to religion as a legal or normative source of
20 Hamidullah, The Muslim Conduct of State (1977), p.vii.
21 See, e.g. S. Rosenne, ‘‘The Influence of Judaism on theDevelopment of International Law:An
Assessment’’ in Janis and Evans (eds), Religion and International Law (2004), pp.63–94; V.P. Nanda,
‘‘International Law in Ancient Hindu India’’ in Janis and Evans (eds), Religion and International
Law (2004), pp.51–61; K.R. Sastry, ‘‘Hinduism and International Law’’ (1966-I) 117 Recueil des
Cours, Academie de Droit International 503; S.C. Jain, ‘‘Jainism, War and International Law’’ (2003)
43 Indian Journal of International Law 748. See also C.G. Weeramantry, Universalising International
Law (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004), pp.17–30. Cf. Lorimer, The Institutes of the Law of
Nations (1883).
22 M.N. Shaw, International Law, 5th edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003),
pp.13–22; D.J. Bederman et al., International Law in Antiquity (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2001); J.L. Brierly, The Law of Nations: An Introduction to the International Law of Peace,
6th edn (H. Waldock (ed.), 1963), p.1; C.A. Stumpf, ‘‘Christian and Islamic Traditions of Public
International Law’’ (2005) 7 Journal of the History of International Law 69.
23 Evans, ‘‘The Double-Edged Sword’’ (2005) 6 Melbourne Journal of International Law 1, 2. See
alsoM. Janis, ‘‘Religion and the Literature of International Law: Some Standard Tests’’ in Janis and
Evans (eds), Religion and International Law (2004), pp.121-143 at p.138 and D. Kennedy. ‘‘Images
of Religion in International Legal Theory’’ in Janis and Evans (eds), Religion and International Law
(2004), pp.145–153.
24 I thank Professor Mathew Craven for his comments on this point.
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international law, except for its provisions on prohibition of religious discrimination.25
Christoph Stumpf notes that this creates a source of ‘‘potential conflict in the relationship
between secularised legal cultures which are customarily labelled ‘Western’, and other
legal cultures that wish to uphold their religious root’’.26 Stumpf’s observation is
reflective of the fact that the world is today constituted of states that operate different
legal cultures, with religion still playing a very visible role in the public sphere and
legal culture of many states, particularly Muslim ones. In the words of Ilias Bantekas,
‘‘[t]o be certain, the world is divided into secular and non-secular countries’’.27 That, in
essence, continues to have significant impact on the relationship between religion and
international law at their different levels of interaction as shall be analysed later.
Thus, despite the substantive secularisation ofmodern international law, the discourse
on the relationship between religion and international law is no longer merely
historically relevant, i.e. ‘‘something that once had mattered’’, but has, from the late
20th into the 21st century, become more substantively relevant, i.e. something that still
matters.28 This is particularly true in the aftermath of the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran
and the Al-Qaeda terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, both of which invoked Islamic
religious sources as their basis of action and both of which have had important impacts
on international law. While this has placed Islam in the forefront of the contemporary
discourse on the relationship between religion and international law, it is by no means
the only religion relevant in this discourse. For example, Richard Falk has referred to the
Fulan Gong movement in China and the political leverage of the religious-right in the
United States of America29 as relevant examples of the religious dynamics in different
parts of the world impacting on modern international relations and international law.
Recently, in the face of diverse contemporary international challenges, especially in
respect of issues relating to peace and security, some international law scholars and
jurists have proposed a recourse to relevant principles of natural law as well as religious
and cultural values to find ways of expanding the scope of modern international law
principles to meet those challenges.30 Other commentators have, especially from an
Islamic perspective, specifically challenged what they consider to be the continued
Euro-Christian underpinnings and influences on modern international law and called
25 See e.g. arts 1(3), 13(1)(b), 55(c) and 76(c) UN Charter.
26 Stumpf, ‘‘Christian and Islamic Traditions’’ (2005) 7 Journal of the History of International Law
69, 70.
27 Bantekas, ‘‘Religion as a Source of International Law’’ (2007), p.116.
28 See generally, e.g. Petito and Hatzopoulos (eds) Religion in International Relations (2003); J.
Haynes, ‘‘Religion and International Relations after 9/11’’ (2005) 12 Democratization 398 (observed
that ‘‘[r]eligion’s role in international relations has recently become an increasingly important
analytical focus’’); andR.I.J. Hackett, ‘‘Rethinking theRole of Religion inChanging Public Spheres:
SomeComparative Perspectives’’ (2005) 3 Brigham Young University Law Review 659, 661 (observed
that ‘‘[t]he early 1990s marked an upsurge in literature recognizing the role of religion in the
public sphere’’).
29 R. Falk, ‘‘Religion and Global Governance: Harmony or Clash?’’ (2002) 19 International
Journal of World Peace 2, 4–5.
30 See, e.g. R. Falk, Religion and Humane Global Governance (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2001); Weeramantry, Universalising International Law (2004), pp.368–389; T. Meron, ‘‘The
Humanization of Humanitarian Law’’ (2000) 94 American Journal of International Law 239, 278.
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for an appreciation of the inputs that other religions, especially Islam, can offer to the
development of modern international law.31 Thus, while Christianity is perceived to
have played an almost unilateral role, at least from the European perspective, in the
historical development of modern international law, other religions are now asserting
their values as relevant factors to be considered in its continued evolution. This brings
us to an examination of the different theoretical perspectives from which the debate on
the relationship between religion and international law are being framed today.
Theoretical perspectives
The main theoretical question in the debate revolves around whether or not religion
ought to have a normative role in modern international law at all. The complex aspect
of the debate is that there are diverse perspectives based on different worldviews and
theoretical arguments. Richard Falk has noted in that regard that:
‘‘There are thosewho view religion as disposed towards extremism, even terrorism,
as soon as it abandons its modernist role as a matter of private faith and belief that
should not intrude upon governance . . . [and their] opponents argue the opposite
thesis, which contends that without rooting governance in the dictates of religious
doctrine, the result is decadence and impotence.’’32
There is a third viewpoint between these two. Thus, the current literature generally
reflects three main theoretical perspectives on the subject, which may be classified as
the ‘‘separationist’’, ‘‘accommodationist’’ and ‘‘double-edged’’ theoretical perspectives
respectively.
Separationist theory
The separationist theoretical perspective reflects a secular positivist viewof international
law, which advocates a strict separation between religion and law and argues that
religion should have no normative role in international law at all. It draws mainly from
the Western, particularly American, liberal concept of the separation of church and
state, which asserts that religion should be a personal matter restricted to the private
sphere of individuals. In his letter to the Danbury Baptists on January 1, 1802, the
third US President Thomas Jefferson expressed this viewpoint by stating that ‘‘religion
is a matter solely between Man & his God’’ and not allowed into the public sphere
of governance generally and of law particularly, by ‘‘building a wall between Church
and State’’.33 Scott Thomas calls this the ‘‘Westphalian presumption’’ in international
31 See, e.g. I. Shihata, ‘‘Islamic Law and the World Community’’ (1962) 4 Harvard International
Club Journal 101; A. Abou-el-Wafa, ‘‘Contributions of Islam to the Development of a Global
Community Based on Rules of International Law’’ in R.S. Macdonald and D.M. Johnston
(eds), Towards World Constitutionalism: Issues in the Legal Ordering of the World Community (Leiden:
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005), pp.305–353. See also generallyM.A. Baderin (ed.), International
Law and Islamic Law (Ashgate, 2008).
32 Falk, ‘‘Religion and Global Governance’’ (2002) 19 International Journal of World Peace 2, 6–7.
33 See T. Jefferson, ‘‘Jefferson’s Letter to the Danbury Baptists’’, January 1, 1802, para.2, US
Library of Congress, http://www.loc.gov/loc/lcib/9806/danpre.html [Accessed August 25, 2009].
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relations, ‘‘which says religious and cultural pluralism cannot be accommodated in a
global multicultural international society, and so must be privatized or nationalized if
there is going to be domestic or international order’’.34 It advocates a ‘‘pure theory’’
of international law aimed at ensuring neutrality of the law and devoid of religious
and cultural reductionism or influence. Thus, the main logic of the separationist theory
is the ‘‘neutrality argument’’, which asserts that a secular positivist international law
is necessary to ensure neutrality in the operation and application of international
law in a manner that ensures equality and non-discrimination in a multi-cultural and
multi-religious global order.
Today, most scholars of international law, particularly from the Western world,
adopt the separationist theory and advocate a secular positivist international law
that is separated from any religious persuasion. For example, in his critique of the
arbitration tribunal’s reference to Islamic law in the Eritrea v Yemen (Phase Two: Maritime
Delimitation) case,35 Michael Reisman argued, inter alia, that ‘‘[t]he essential function of
general international law, as a secular corpus juris, is to provide a common standard
and to play a mediating role between states with different cultures, legal systems, and
belief systems’’ and thus international tribunals ‘‘would be well advised to stick to
international law’’36 in that secular form. A similar point, but in a different context,
was made by Antonio Cassese in his criticism of the Israeli Commission of Inquiry’s
reference to Rabbinic law in the Sabra and Shatila Inquiry of 1982 and its complete
shunning of international law in the process.37 Also in his comments on the observation
by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Case Concerning United States Diplomatic
and Consular Staff in Tehran38 that the traditions of Islam have made a substantial
contribution to the principle of the inviolability of the persons of diplomatic agents
and premises, Ilias Bantekas has argued that there was no need for the court to have
made a reference to Islam on this point as there was sufficient substantive principles of
international law that the court could have relied upon on that issue.39
In contrast with this, it may be submitted that such complementary references to
religious law by international tribunals in relevant cases reflect an accommodationist
approach, which can contribute positively to the development of customary
international law.However, this should not extend to the total avoidance of international
law as appears to have been the approach taken by the Israeli Commission in the Sabra
and Shatila Inquiry as analysed by Cassese in his observation that the Commission set
aside both Israeli military law and international law ‘‘and referred exclusively to moral
and religious imperatives’’ on that occasion.40 Rather, the argument here is that relevant
religious law can be persuasively cited to complement international law for the purpose
34 See S.M. Thomas, The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International
Relations (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p.151.
35 Eritrea v Yemen (Phase Two: Maritime Delimitation) case [119] I.L.R. 417.
36 W.M. Reisman, ‘‘Eritrea-Yemen Arbitration (Award, Phase II: Maritime Delimitation)’’
(2000) 94 American Journal of International Law 721, 729.
37 A. Cassese, ‘‘Sabra and Shatila’’ in A. Cassese (ed.), Violence and Law in the Modern Age
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), p.76 at pp.78–80.
38 Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran [1980] I.C.J. Rep. 41.
39 Bantekas, ‘‘Religion as a Source of International Law’’ (2007), p.127.
40 Cassese, ‘‘Sabra and Shatila’’ (1988), p.79 (original emphasis).
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of establishing the existence of customary international law in relevant cases, especially
where such religious law is a formal part of national law. There is no rule of international
law that prohibits doing so. Actually, it is recognised under international law that states’
municipal laws may in certain circumstances form the basis of customary rules.41 This
point will be further elaborated in the section on doctrinal perspectives later. Mark Janis
has advanced a similar argument that international law needs to ‘‘draw on the many
different religious, political, economic and social traditions to find values common
to the many nations, which may be adopted as norms in customary [international]
law’’.42
The neutrality argument of the separationist theory has however been challenged,
both in its national and international contexts, on the contention that the argument
is itself based on certain presumptions that are not really neutral in themselves. For
example, Douglas Laycock refers to Michael McConnell’s argument that ‘‘neutrality is
not a self-defining concept, because properly defined, it is often at odds with religious
liberty’’.43 Also David Cinotti has observed that ‘‘neutrality is an indeterminate and
vacant idea because one may always counter neutrality-based arguments by reframing
the definition of neutrality or by making counterarguments also from neutrality’’.44 The
problem with the neutrality argument is that there is always the need to establish a
baseline from which deviations from neutrality can be assessed, and the choice of that
baseline is not neutral itself.45 In particular, a strict secular system of international law
may not necessarily be as neutral as is often presumed. Thus, Carl Esbeck has critiqued
the separationist theory as follows:
‘‘Separationism, this most dominant of theories is in no sense the inevitable product
of objective reason unadulterated by an ideological commitment to some higher
point of reference. Separationism cannot stand outside of the political and religious
milieu from which it emerged and honestly claim to be neutral concerning the
nature and contemporary value of religion or the purposes of modern government.
The same must be said for its primary competitor, the neutrality theory. Indeed,
to demand that any theory of church/state relations transcend its pedigree or its
presuppositions and be substantively neutral is to ask the impossible.’’46
41 M.N. Shaw, International Law, 5th edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p.79.
42 M.W. Janis, ‘‘Religion and International Law’’ (1993) 87 ASIL Proceedings 321–322.
43 D. Laycock, ‘‘Formal, Substantive and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion’’ (1990)
39 DePaul Law Review 993, 994.
44 D.N. Cinotti, ‘‘Incoherence of Neutrality: A Case for Eliminating Neutrality from Religion
Clause Jurisprudence’’ (2003) 45 Journal of Church and State 499, 500. See also F. Ravitch, ‘‘A Funny
thing Happened on the Way to Neutrality: Broad Principles, Formalism, and the Establishment
Clause’’ (2004) 38Georgia Law Review 489 (asserted that ‘‘neutrality,whether formal or substantive,
does not exist’’).
45 See C.H. Esbeck, ‘‘A Constitutional Case for Governmental Co-operation with Faith-Based
Social Service Providers’’ (1997) 46 Emory Law Journal 1, 5; Ravitch, ‘‘A Funny thing Happened on
the Way to Neutrality’’ (2004) 38 Georgia Law Review 489, 493–506. See also R. Ahdar and I. Leigh,
Religious Freedom in the Liberal State (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp.90–92.
46 Esbeck, ‘‘AConstitutional Case forGovernmentalCo-operation’’ (1997) 46Emory Law Journal
1, 5.
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The historical awareness of the separationist perception of international law is generally
motivated by a post-Reformation and post-Westphalian interpretation of international
relations which is informed by Europe’s experiences during the 16th and 17th centuries.
The Peace of Westphalia was reached after a century of religious wars that ravaged
Europe between 1550 and 1650. Scott Thomas has noted that this has led to the
general impression inmodern international relations that ‘‘when religion is brought into
domestic or international public life . . . it inherently causeswar, intolerance, devastation,
political upheaval, and maybe even the collapse of the international order’’47 and thus
must be excluded from both the political and legal realms of international relations
generally, and international law specifically. He described this interpretation of the
wars of religion in Europe as both a ‘‘political mythology of liberalism’’ and the ‘‘myth
of the modern secular state’’ which continue to affect ‘‘the way culture and religion are
interpreted in international relations today’’.48 Thomas thereby proposed the view that
‘‘[a] new approach to international order is requiredwhich overcomes this ‘Westphalian
presumption’’’.49
Thus, while the separationist theory is historically aware, its historical awareness is
based on a European experience,which has been challenged in the contemporary debate
on the relationship between religion and international law. The general contention is
that the war of religions experienced in Europe may not necessarily reflect the religious
experiences of other civilisations in relation to the accommodation of religious norms
within the public sphere of law and governance and does not thus, necessarily, reflect a
universalworldview on the subject. Furthermore, a strict dichotomybetween the private
and the public spheres, as required under this theory, is not easily determinable in a
clear way because the private and public spheres overlap extensively in all societies.50
Carolyn Evans has observed in that regard that,
‘‘even if religion is often distinguished from law in Western legal and political
philosophy, and largely ignored in legal writing, no such division can be neatly
maintained in the real world. This is particularly the case inmany parts of theworld
. . . where the law and religion are often deeply intertwined and religion may play
a more meaningful and significant role in influencing behaviour than does law.’’51
Practically, the separationist theory is not universally accepted, for religion still plays a
significant public role in many states today, and the world remains divided into secular
47 Thomas, The Global Resurgence of Religion (2005), p.22. See also Ahdar and Leigh, Religious
Freedom in the Liberal State (2005), p.73 (where the authors argue that ‘‘[f]or Enlightenment
separationists, separating church and state ensured that dangerous religious passions and
‘superstitions’ would be confined to the private sphere. When religion and government mixed
the outcome could be disastrous as the Wars of Religion testified’’).
48 Thomas, The Global Resurgence of Religion (2005).
49 S.M. Thomas, ‘‘Taking Religious and Cultural Pluralism Seriously: The Global Resurgence
of Religion and the Transformation of International Society’’ (2000) 29 Millennium: Journal of
International Studies 815.
50 S.M. Thomas, ‘‘Taking Religious and Cultural Pluralism Seriously: The Global Resurgence
of Religion and the Transformation of International Society’’ (2000) 29 Millennium: Journal of
International Studies 3, 815–841, 835.
51 Evans, ‘‘The Double-Edged Sword’’ (2005) 6 Melbourne Journal of International Law 1, 2
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and non-secular countries. This brings us to the second theoretical perspective—the
accommodationist theory.
Accommodationist theory
The accommodationist theoretical perspective advances the view that religion can play
a positive and important normative role in international law and should therefore
be accommodated in that regard. This perception is based on a naturalist view of
international law, which was traditionally underpinned by religion as analysed in the
historical perspective above. Proponents of this view assert that religious considerations
are so important for themajorityof theworld’spopulation that they cannot be considered
irrelevant to the public sphere of law generally and of international law particularly.52
They argue that since many aspects of international law, such as human rights,
humanitarian law, environmental law, disarmament and maintenance of international
peace and security are all underpinnedby considerations ofmorality andhumandignity,
religious traditions andnorms canmakepositive contributions in that regard and should
therefore be normatively accommodatedwithin the principles of international law.53 For
example, Christopher Weeramantry, a former judge of the ICJ, is a foremost advocate
of this view. He has observed notably that:
‘‘Given the strength in the modern world of religious traditions, such as the
Buddhist, Christian, Hindu and Islamic, and that they command the allegiance of
over three billion of the world’s population, there cannot be any doubt that future
thinking on international law can benefit deeply from the teachings contained in
these traditions.’’54
Similarly, in answering the question of whether religion has served as a catalyst or
impediment to international law, Mark Janis has identified three important facilitative
roles that religion could play in international law:
‘‘First, religion traditionally has been one of the most fertile sources of the rules
of international law. It may well be that all religious traditions have norms that
are applicable to the relations of states and their peoples . . . One of the major
tasks confronting international lawyers in the modern era is to draw on the many
different religious, political, economic and social traditions to find values common
to the many nations, which may be adopted as norms in customary law. This
should be a mission, not only for scholars of international law, but also for scholars
of all the world’s religious faiths.
Secondly, religious belief has been one of the chief motivations for enthusiasts
of international law. Religious principle and dedication were, for example, at
52 See, e.g. Weeramantry, Universalising International Law (2004), p.368 (observed that more
than four billion of the world’s population are inspired by religious beliefs and norms).
53 See, e.g. A.A. An-Na’im, ‘‘Islam and Human Rights: Beyond the Universality Debate’’
(2000) 94 ASIL Proceedings 95 (noted in relation to international human rights law that ‘‘religious
considerations are too important for the majority of people for human rights scholars and
advocates to continue to dismiss them simply as irrelevant, insignificant, or problematic’’).
54 Weeramantry, Universalising International Law (2004), p.15.
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the heart of the movement in the nineteenth century for the promotion of
international arbitration and adjudication. Many twentieth-century achievements
of international law and international organization stem from the nineteenth-
century religious enthusiasts of international law. That such religiously based
enthusiasm for international law still exists is easily seen by an observation of the
record religious groups surrounding such international causes as human rights
law, disarmament and environmental law.
Thirdly, the morality of religion has provided some of the glue that has made
international law stick. The binding force of any law, international law included,
cannot rest solely on force. The legitimacy of international law and international
organizations ultimately is a function of widespread individual beliefs that the
law and its authorities are right and appropriate. International lawyers have long
recognized the potential of religious and moral belief for building a sense of
international community whereby the peoples of the globe will be concerned with
the fate of all the nations, not just their own.’’55
With specific reference to international humanitarian law, Carolyn Evans has equally
argued that religion,
‘‘can have persuasive value to those who are, or who consider themselves to
be, outside the scope of traditional international law, particularly the ever more
important non-state actor. It can add an importantmoral or emotional dimension to
reasons for compliance with international law. Even a pragmatic, secular advocate
of international humanitarian lawmay see strategic advantages to the selective use
of aspects of religious traditions to bolster compliance and commitment to the laws
of war.’’56
The accommodationist theory has often been found useful by other religious advocates
who seek to challenge the Euro-Christian foundations of modern international law
and their perceived continuing influence on many aspects of modern global order
despite their formal post-UN secularisation. The contention is that through the
accommodationist theory, other religions can contribute positively to the development
of international law in away thatmakes its principlesmuchmore universally persuasive
to all religions and peoples. The late Ibrahim Shihata, a former Secretary General of
the International Center for Settlement of International Disputes and General Counsel
for the World Bank, reflected this view in an early proposition about the need to study
the possible contributions that Islamic law could bring to the development of modern
international law,
‘‘in order to eliminate a major excuse for the violation of international law,
there should be greater participation by other legal systems in the formation and
development of international law. For by reflecting to a greater extent on the
principles of non-European legal systems in the rules of international law, the
validity and fairness of international law will be more widely recognized and more
55 M.W. Janis, ‘‘Religion and International Law’’ (1993) 87 ASIL Proceedings 321.
56 Evans, ‘‘The Double-Edged Sword’’ (2005) 6 Melbourne Journal of International Law 1, 2.
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strongly supported . . . Through this approach, contemporary international law
will probably prove to be a more readily accepted system to [the] vast part of the
international community vaguely referred to as the ‘Muslim world’.’’57
However, the accommodationist theory has its own limitation too. The main weakness
and challenge to this theory is that it is usually presented simplistically, with most
of its advocates failing to acknowledge that there are also traditional provisions
within all religions that could be contrary to some principles of modern international
law in one way or another. There are contemporary examples of violations of some
fundamental principles of international law by states and non-state actors alike who
invoke traditional religious principles and viewpoints to justify their actions. Thus, in
his answer to whether religion has served as a catalyst or impediment to international
law, Mark Janis noted that apart from its potential of facilitating international law,
religion also has the potential ‘‘to complicate the work of international lawyers [and
scholars]’’,58 which brings us to the examination of the third theoretical perspective of
the relationship between religion and international law—the double-edged theory.
Double-edged theory
The double-edged theoretical perspective lies between the separationist and
accommodationist theories. It generally reflects a realist viewof the relationship between
religion and international law and argues primarily that religion is like a double-edged
sword that could be utilised either positively or negatively in its relationship with
international law and vice versa. In advancing the double-edged theory in relation to
international humanitarian law, Carolyn Evans observed that ‘‘[s]ome writers focus
only on the positive aspects of a particular religious tradition and dismiss any negative
role played by that religion as a misinterpretation of its true meaning’’, while ‘‘[o]ther
writers choose only to focus on the more dangerous and divisive aspects of religion’’59
without acknowledging the positive aspects. That is a one-sided approach, which does
not present a full and accurate perception of the relationship. The double-edged theory
remedies that by recognising, on the one hand, that there are religious traditions and
norms that are international law friendly and can be utilised positively to promote
compliance with international law, and, on the other, the fact that some traditional
religious principles apparently conflict with some international law norms.
In addressing the relevance of religion to modern global governance, Richard Falk
not only acknowledges the double-edged theory but also points out the effect of each of
its two edges and proposes how to deal with each of them:
‘‘all great religions have two broad tendencies within their traditions: the first is
to be universalistic and tolerant toward those who hold other convictions and
identities; the second is to be exclusivist and insistent that there is only one true
path to salvation, which if not taken, results in evil. From such a standpoint, the
57 Shihata, ‘‘Islamic Law and theWorld Community’’ (1962) 4Harvard International Club Journal
101, 101–102.
58 Janis, ‘‘Religion and International Law’’ (1993) 87 ASIL Proceedings 321.
59 Evans, ‘‘The Double-Edged Sword’’ (2005) 6 Melbourne Journal of International Law 1, 2.
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first orientation of religion is constructive, useful, and essential if the world is to
find its way to humane global governance in the decades ahead, while the second is
regressive and carries with it a genuine danger of a new cycle of religious warfare
carried out on a civilizational scale. The hope of the future is to give prominence
and support to this universalizing influence of religion and, at the same time, to
marginalize religious extremism based on an alleged dualism between good and
evil.’’60
While Falk’s proposition for dealing with each of the two edges of this theory, (i.e.
‘‘give prominence and support to [the] universalizing influence of religion’’ on the one
hand, and on the other ‘‘marginalize religious extremism based on an alleged dualism
betweengoodandevil’’) is logical andadmirable, theproblematic aspect iswith the latter
point on how to marginalise religious extremism. Realistically, it would be extremely
difficult to achieve such marginalisation of religious extremism at the grassroots level
so long as secular international law continues to be seen by the grassroots populace,
especially in the developing world, as being politically manipulated by the elite in the
developed world, and consequently regarded as incapable of doing equity or resolving
international crisis impartially. This is particularly true, for example, of the long running
international crisis in the Middle East. There is no doubt that the Israeli-Palestinian
crisis continues to influence the political and religious attitude of many Muslim states,
organisations and individuals inways that have impacted negatively on the relationship
between religion and international law. Marc Gopin has emphasised the need for the
international community to appreciate the fact that religion has an important role to
play in the Israeli-Palestinian crisis. He argues that international law’s failure to resolve
the crisis thus far ‘‘stems in large part from its complete neglect of cultural and religious
factors’’ and thus called for ‘‘greater integration of the religious communities of the
region into the peace-building efforts’’, asserting that ‘‘only by including religion in the
peace process can we move past fragile and superficial agreements and toward a deep
and lasting solution, to the crisis’’.61
Thus, it is important to note that, similar to religion in its relationship with
international law, international law can have a double-edged effect in its relationship
with religion. On the one hand, international law can positively facilitate the flourishing
of religion through its guarantee of international religious freedom and prohibition of
international religious discrimination, but could, on the other hand, also be negatively
applied to restrict religious beliefs and norms by indiscriminately considering them
incompatible with relevant principles of international law. A strict and indiscriminate
secular interpretation of international law may sometimes have negative impacts on
personal religious beliefs and practices of individuals and groups, which could diminish
their confidence in a strictly secular system of international law. This is apparent, for
example, in the current jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights which
sanctions the prohibition, by some states, of the wearing of headscarves by Muslim
women in public places,62 and also the court’s general view that democracy and human
60 Falk, ‘‘Religion and Global Governance’’ (2002) 19 International Journal of World Peace 2, 7.
61 M. Gorpin, Holy War, Holy Peace: How Religion Can Bring Peace to the Middle East (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2002), inner front jacket.
62 See Sahin v Turkey (2005) 44 E.H.R.R. 5 ECtHR.
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rights could not be respected within a system based on the Islamic Shariah.63 These
positions have been well critiqued by human rights scholars and commentators.64
The possible negative impacts of an indiscriminate international secularism on the
relationship between religion and international law are well reflected in Elizabeth
Hurd’s observation that:
‘‘In an interdependent world in which individuals draw from different sources of
morality, an indiscriminate secularism leads to three risks. There is the potential
of a backlash from proponents of non-secular alternatives who are shut out of
deliberations on the contours of public order. There is a risk of shutting down new
approaches to the negotiation between religion and politics, in particular those
drawn from non-Western perspectives. Finally, there is a risk of remaining blind to
the limitations of secularism itself.’’65
Richard Falk advances a similar view regarding what he calls ‘‘secular intolerance’’ in
his own observation that,
‘‘secular views that hold the line against their perception of religion also can adopt
fundamentalist canons of belief, and view those who seek to center their identity on
religious affiliation as intrinsically evil. Such secular intolerance is as unwelcome
with respect to informing patterns of global governance as its religious counterpart.
Both religionists and secularists can only contribute to the emergence of humane
forms of global governance if they adhere to an ethos of tolerance.’’66
Thedouble-edged theory thusprovides uswith an important perceptive tool for a critical
evaluation of the relationship between religion and international law. It serves as a realis-
tic and objective analytical process for understanding andmanaging that relationship in
amanner that can lead to a mutually beneficial interaction between the two systems and
thereby facilitate the realisation of a more humane and universal international law. This
63 See Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) v Turkey (2001) 35 E.H.R.R. 3 ECtHR, upheld by the Grand
Chamber in (2003) 37 E.H.R.R. 1 ECtHR.
64 See, e.g. T. Hoopes, ‘‘The Leyla Sahin v Turkey Case Before the European Court of Human
Rights’’ (2006) Chinese Journal of International Law 719; U. Ali, ‘‘The Islamic Headscarf Problem
before Secular Legal Systems: Factual and Legal Developments in Turkish, French and European
Human Rights Law’’ (2007) 9 European Journal of Migration and Law 419; A. Vakulenko, ‘‘Islamic
Headscarves and the European Convention on Human Rights: An Intersectional Perspective’’
(2007) 16 Social and Legal Studies 183; M. Ssenyonjo, ‘‘The Islamic Veil and Freedom of Religion,
the Rights to Education andWork: A Survey of Recent International and National Cases’’ (2007) 6
Chinese Journal of International Law 653; K. Boyle, ‘‘Human Rights, Religion and Democracy:
The Refah party Case’’ (2004) 1 Essex Human Rights Review 1: C. Moe, ‘‘Refah Revisited:
Strasbourg’s Construction of Islam’’, paper presented at the Conference of Experts at Central
European University, Budapest, Hungary, June 12–15, 2003, http://www.strasbourgconference.org/
papers/Refah%20Revisited-%20Strasbourg’s%20Construction%20of%20Islam.pdf.
65 E.S. Hurd, ‘‘The Political Authority of Secularism in International Relations’’ (2004) 10
European Journal of International Relations 235, 240.
66 Falk, ‘‘Religion and Global Governance’’ (2002) 19 International Journal of World Peace 2, 7.
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is where the importance of ‘‘human agency’’67 comes into play. How the relationship
turns out in the endwould largely depend on deliberate choicesmade by human beings,
i.e. both religionists and secularists. Our choices in that regard determine whether our
global order turns out to be peaceful or violent. Thus, the double-edged theory calls
for good faith, humaneness, pragmatism as well as political and legal dynamism on the
part of both religious and secular advocates of international law. This brings us to the
examination of the empirical and doctrinal perspectives of the relationship.
Empirical and doctrinal perspectives
Practically, religion and international law may interact at four main levels as will be
analysed in this section. While the formal public role of Islam in the domestic laws
of many Muslim states makes it feature prominently in the illustrations, the analysis
applies similarly to other religions in that regard.
The first level of interaction is in relation to the domestic laws of states where religion
plays a formal role in national laws and policies. Owing to its public role in such
domestic systems, religion becomes directly relevant in the interaction of international
law with the domestic law of such states. Currently, that level of interaction occurs
mostly in Muslim states whose constitutions formally recognise Islam as the religion
of the state and Islamic law as part of domestic law. There are currently a significant
number of Muslim states in that regard.68 The formal role of Islam in such states has
influenced those states’ practices in relation to international law in different ways,
sometimes positively and sometimes negatively.69 This has been analysed elsewhere
where it was argued that the relationship between Islam and international human rights
law in Muslim states need not necessarily be negative and adversarial but could be
positive and harmonistic, and might thereby facilitate the realisation of the ideals of
international law in Muslim states.70 The interaction between religion and international
law at this level is relatively limited in states where religion has no formal place
in domestic law. For example, Ilias Bantekas has noted that while Christianity does
inevitably influence a variety of policies in some Western countries, the policy of those
countries remains essentially and formally based on secular principles in relation to
international law.71
67 The idea of ‘‘human agency’’ in this context is borrowed fromAbdullahi An-Na’im’s theory
of interdependence between religion, secularism and human rights. See A.A. An-Na’im, ‘‘The
Interdependence of Religion, Secularism, and Human Rights: Prospects for Islamic Societies’’
(2005) 11 Common Knowledge 56, wherein he notes that ‘‘[h]uman agency is always integral to the
interpretation and implementation of every doctrine’’ (at 64).
68 See, e.g. T. Stahnke andR.C. Blitt, ‘‘TheReligion-State Relationship and the Right to Freedom
of Religion or Belief: A Comparative Textual Analysis of the Constitutions of Predominantly
Muslim Countries’’ (2005) 36 Georgetown Journal of International Law 7.
69 See, e.g. M.A. Baderin, ‘‘A Macroscopic Analysis of the Practice of Muslim State Parties to
International Human Rights Treaties: Conflict or Congruence?’’ (2001) 1 H.R.L.Rev. 265.
70 M. Baderin, ‘‘Islam and the Realization of Human Rights in the MuslimWorld: A Reflection
on Two Essential Approaches and Two Divergent Perspectives’’ (2007) 4(1) Muslim World Journal
of Human Rights, Article 5.
71 Bantekas, ‘‘Religion as a Source of International Law’’ (2007), p.117.
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The second level of interaction is in relation to regional inter-governmental
organisations (RIGOs). Their importance in international law is very well reflected
in Ch.VIII of the UN Charter, and where religion plays a formal role in the objectives
of a RIGO, that inevitably creates the possibility of an interaction between religion and
international law at the regional level. The Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC)
is a distinctive example in that regard. The objectives enumerated in the OIC Charter
include the promotion of Islamic spiritual, ethical, social and economic values among
the Member States as an important means of achieving progress for humanity.72 The
OIC has adopted many instruments that make reference to Islam as a relevant factor in
relation to international law in the Muslim world. While it has consistently expressed
its commitment to international law and co-operation with the United Nations, it has
also emphasised the role of Islam in that regard.73 For example, in 2004 the organisation
made a submission to the UN General Assembly in respect of proposed reforms of the
UN Security Council stating that ‘‘any reform proposal, which neglects the adequate
representation of the Islamic Ummah in any category of members in an expanded
Security Council will not be acceptable to the Islamic countries’’.74 This obviously
reflects an accommodationist approach as earlier analysed. Formal interaction between
religion and international law at this level is relatively limited in the case of RIGOs
operating in systems where religion does not play a formal role. For example, a
proposal by European Churches for a formal recognition and reference to Christianity
in the Constitution of the European Union during the drafting and consultation stages
of the Constitution was discarded in the end, which was obviously a reflection of the
separationist theory as earlier analysed.75
The third level of interaction is in relation to the religious freedom of individuals
and groups, while the fourth level is in relation to other non-state actors such as
religious non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and institutions. As international
law has, today, moved beyond its traditional state-centric nature, it applies not only
strictly to states but may impact directly or indirectly on the lives and activities of
individuals, groups and other non-state actors. Thus the interaction between religion
and international law occurs not only in relation to the practices of states and inter-
governmental organisations but also in relation to the religious beliefs and practices of
individuals and groups. Relevant aspects of international law, such as human rights,
environmental law, refugee law and humanitarian law bring international law into
direct contact with the religious beliefs and practices of individuals and groups in
72 See the Preamble and art.II(A)(1) of the OIC Charter. In its letter of January 21, 2009 to
the new US President Barak Obama, congratulating and inviting him to ‘‘a New Partnership’’,
the organisation however emphasised that it ‘‘is not a religious organization’’, that ‘‘[a]fter the
United Nations, it is the largest official, inter-governmental organization in the world’’, that ‘‘[i]t
is composed of 57 sovereign states, almost all of whom are secular’’ and that ‘‘[t]he population
of these states collectively amounts to 1.5 billion—or one fourth of humanity’’. Available at
http://www.oic-oci.org/topic detail.asp?t id=1818&x key= [Accessed August 25, 2009].
73 See, e.g. ‘‘Final Document of the General Meeting on Cooperation between the United
Nations and the Organization of the Islamic Conference’’, Geneva, July 8–10, 2008, http://www.oic-
oci.org/english/conf/un-oic/oic-un-08.pdf [Accessed August 25, 2009].
74 UN Doc.A/59/425/S/2004/808 (October 11, 2004), para.56.
75 See Bantekas, ‘‘Religion as a Source of International Law’’ (2007), pp.129–130.
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different parts of the world today. As earlier noted, international human rights law
acknowledges the importance of religion in society by providing for the right to freedom
of religion, which includes the right to collective practice and public manifestation of
religion by individuals and groups so long as this does not violate public order or
the fundamental rights of others.76 It also prohibits religious discrimination against
individuals and groups,77 which can facilitate the flourishing of religious values and
promote social harmony.’ On the other hand, international law does challenge religious
norms in differentways,which raises the possibility of a conflicting relationship between
the two. A common example is the possibility of conflict between the limits of freedom
of expression and freedom of religion under international human rights law. Typical
examples in relation to Islam and Muslims were the Salman Rushdie affair of 1988–89
and the Danish Cartoon incident of 2006.
Apart from the relationship at the level of individuals and groups, many NGOs
are inspired by religious principles and values to participate actively and positively
in different areas of international law. The need for interaction between religion and
international law at the level of NGOs and other religious institutions was demonstrated
by the hosting of a conference on interfaith co-operation to promote world peace within
the context of international law at the UN headquarters in June 2005. At its end, the
conference recommended ‘‘an expansion and deepening of the relationship between
the United Nations and civil society, including religious NGOs’’.78 The relationship at
this level is also demonstrated by the active involvement and influence of religious
institutions such as the Roman Catholic Church on issues such as abortion, the
death penalty, use of force, human rights and other important issues of international
law.79
The consequential question from the empirical analysis is whether these different
practical levels of interaction between religion and international law establish any legal
basis for religion as a possible normative source of obligation or right under international
law, which brings us to the doctrinal perspective of the relationship.
As earlier stated, the UN Charter makes no direct reference to religion as a source
of international law. However, it contains no provision prohibiting a relationship
or interaction between religion and international law either. Under art.38 of the ICJ
Statute,80 the main sources of international law are international treaties, customary
international law and general principles of law recognised by civilised nations.81
Certainly, where states parties to an international treaty consent to the inclusion of a
religious principle or norm as a provision in a treaty this would bind the parties so long
as it did not violate a peremptory norm of jus cogens under general international law.82 A
76 See, e.g. art.19 ICCPR.
77 See, e.g. art.2 ICCPR.
78 Report of the Convening Group of the Conference on Interfaith Cooperation for Peace: Enhancing
Interfaith Dialogue and Cooperation towards Peace in the 21st Century, June 22, 2005, UNHeadquarters,
New York, p.2.
79 See Bantekas, ‘‘Religion as a Source of International Law’’ (2007), pp.131–132.
80 The ICJ Statute is annexed to the UN Charter, of which it forms an integral part.
81 The subsidiary sources are ‘‘judicial decisions and teachings of the most qualified publicists
of the various nations’’ and not considered here.
82 This is pursuant to art.53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969).
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good example is the provision in art.20(3) of the 1989UNConvention on the Rights of the
Child83 which includes ‘‘kafalah of Islamic law’’ as a recognisedmeans of alternative care
for a child temporarily or permanently deprived of his or her family environment. This
inclusion of a relevant norm of Islamic law in a substantive provision of a treaty under
international law demonstrates the practicality of the accommodationist theoretical
perspective analysed above.
With regard to customary international law, it was argued earlier that the willingness
of international tribunals to refer to relevant religious principles in the Eritrea v Yemen
and the United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran cases can contribute to the
development of customary international law, especially by identifying particular local
practices accepted as law between specific groups of states. For example, in the Eritrea
v Yemen case the tribunal had referred, inter alia, to Islamic principles to establish that
‘‘the traditional fishing regime around the Hanish and Zuqar Islands and the islands of
Jabal al-Tayr and the Zubayr group is one of free access and enjoyment for the fishermen
of both Eritrea and Yemen’’, which must be preserved for their benefit.84 That approach
was a relevant and valid means of establishing the local custom between the parties
based on the facts before the tribunal. Similarly, in the Saudi Arabia v Aramco case,
the Arbitrator referred to relevant principles of Islamic law and a quotation from the
Koran to support the customary nature and the universal recognition of the principle
of pacta sunt servanda in international law. He observed that Islamic law recognises that
agreements and pacts must be fulfilled in good faith ‘‘as expressed in the Koran: ‘Be
faithful to your pledge, when you enter into a pact’’’.85 Another significant example is
the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weeramantry (as he then was) in the case concerning
the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,86 which referred to different religious
traditions in the following terms:
‘‘It greatly strengthens the concept of humanitarian laws of war to note that this is
not a recent invention, nor the product of any one culture. The concept is of ancient
origin, with a lineage stretching back at least three millennia. As already observed,
it is deep-rooted in many cultures—Hindu, Buddhist, Chinese, Christian, Islamic
and traditional African. These cultures have all given expression to a variety of
limitations on the extent to which any means can be used for the purposes of
fighting one’s enemy. The problem under consideration is a universal problem,
and this Court is a universal Court, whose composition is required by its Statute
to reflect the world’s principal cultural traditions. The multicultural traditions that
exist on this important matter cannot be ignored in the Court’s consideration of
this question, for to do so would be to deprive its conclusions of that plenitude
of universal authority which is available to give it added strength—the strength
83 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.
84 Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the Second Stage of the Proceedings between Eritrea and Yemen
(Maritime Delimitation), December 17, 1999, at [101].
85 Saudi Arabia v Aramco (1963) 27 I.L.R. 117.
86 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (1996) 35 I.L.M., http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/
files/95/7495.pdf [Accessed August 25, 2009].
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resulting from the depth of the tradition’s historical roots and the width of its
geographical spread.’’87
The learned judge went on to analyse the relevant principles of the different religions
to accumulate universal support for his opinion that the use or threat of use of nuclear
weapons must be seen as illegal in all circumstances under international law.
Other cases in which the ICJ has referred to Islamic law, religious principles, or norms
in its decisions include the Western Sahara case88 in which the court’s consideration of
sovereignty in international law noted, inter alia, that ‘‘[e]ven the Dar al-Islam [under
classical Islamic political theory]’’ recognised ‘‘separate States within the common
religious bond of Islam’’. This helped establish its finding that Western Sahara was a
state of a special character at the time of the Spanish colonisation.89 Another example
is the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory
Case90 in which the Court, to complement its reference to the general guarantees of
freedom of movement under art.12 ICCPR, noted that ‘‘account must also be taken of
specific guarantees of access to the Christian, Jewish and Islamic Holy Places’’ and that
‘‘the status of the Christian Holy Places in the Ottoman Empire dates far back in time’’.91
These cases and references by international tribunals establish that while religion
may not serve directly as a normative source of obligation under international law,
it can nevertheless serve as a valid complementary means of establishing customary
international law or establishing state practice in relevant cases. As was said by the
tribunal in the Eritrea v Yemen case, again in relation to Islamic law:
‘‘. . . [I]n today’s world, it remains true that the fundamental moralistic general
principles of the Quran and the Sunnamay validly be invoked for the consolidation
and support of positive international law rules in their progressive development
towards the goal of achieving justice and promoting the human dignity of
mankind.’’92
The same is true of relevant ‘‘moralistic general principles’’ of all other religions, as was
eruditely reflected by Judge Weeramantry in his Dissenting Opinion in the Legality of
the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons case cited earlier.
State representatives and scholars of international lawhave also asserted the relevance
of religious principles under art.38 of the ICJ Statute, which refers to ‘‘the general
principles of law recognised by civilised nations’’, as well as art.9, which provides that
in electing the judges of the ICJ,
87 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weeramantry, at [2], http://www.cornnet.nl/ akmalten/
uweerama.html [Accessed August 25, 2009].
88 Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara, October 16, 1975, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/61/
6195.pdf [Accessed August 25, 2009].
89 Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara, October 16, 1975, at [95].
90 Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, July 9, 2004, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/131/1671.pdf [Accessed August
25, 2009].
91 Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, July 9, 2004, at [129].
92 Eritrea v Yemen (Phase Two: Maritime Delimitation) case [119] I.L.R. 417.
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‘‘the election shall bear in mind not only that the persons to be elected should
individually possess the qualifications required, but also that in the body as a
whole the representation of the main forms of civilisations and of the principal
legal systems of the world should be assured’’.
In a memorandum presented by delegates of Muslim states to the League of Nations
in September 1939 and to the UN Conference in San Francisco in April 1945, it was
submitted that Islam constituted one of the main forms of civilisation and Islamic law
one of the principal legal systems of the world referred to in art.38 of the Statute of
the Permanent Court of International Justice under the League of Nations, which was
subsequently adopted as art.38 of the ICJ Statute.93 A survey of different statements by
Muslim states and the OIC shows that this remains the view of many Muslim states
today. A similar assertion has been made in the context of Judaism by Shabtai Rosenne.
He has argued that the provisions of art.9 of the ICJ Statute acknowledge the need for
international law to ‘‘draw upon the general legal experience of mankind’’, which, he
argued, ‘‘draws attention to certain features of what might be termed the intellectual
components of public international law, and as such, as is being increasingly recognized,
it has wider implications’’.94
Thus, even within the conventional doctrines of modern international law, it is
possible to find a legal basis for the use of religious traditions and norms to enhance
particular rules of international law, and the legitimacy of international law in general.
Conclusion
The primary question addressed by this paper, as reflected by its title, is whether
religion and international law are friends or foes. One of the points to emerge is that
there exists an old and ongoing romance between religion and international law, which
would be very difficult, if not impossible, to dissolve. The strings of that romance are
however in the hands of people, as human agents for both religion and international
law, and they can be pulled for better or for worse. Neither the separationist nor
accommodationist theory brings the best out of this relationship. Strict adherence
to the separationist theory portrays an adversarial relationship between religion and
international law—or even promotes such a relationship—and it closes our eyes to
the positive contributions that religion has made and could still make to enhance
and legitimise modern international law. The accommodationist theory portrays a
harmonistic picture between religion and international law, but its idealistic tendency
may lead us naively to disregard areas of tension which need careful consideration and
resolution for the benefit of our common humanity. This leads to the conclusion that
the relationship between religion and international law should be objectively perceived
as double-edged—capable of being either amicable or adversarial, depending on what
we, the human agents of the relationship, i.e. both religionists and secularists, want it
to be. Abdullahi An-Na’im has noted in that regard that ‘‘reference to states, countries
93 See S. Mahmassani, ‘‘The Principles of International Law in the Light of Islamic Doctrine’’
(1968) 117 Recueil des Cours, Collected Course 201, 222.
94 Rosenne, ‘‘The Influence of Judaism on the Development of International Law’’ (2004), p.63.
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or international organizations like the United Nations is really to people who control
the state apparatus, inhabit a country or work through international institutions’’, and
that ‘‘[w]hether institutions and organizations are religious, political or diplomatic, the
question about their relationship to [international law] is always about how people
negotiate power, justice, and pragmatic self-interest, at home and abroad’’.95
On the one hand, the importance of international law will continue to be felt
as the world becomes globally smaller and nation-states and peoples become more
interdependent. On the other, the fact that strong religious convictions exist throughout
the world means that religion will continue to have significant impact on international
law in each of their identified levels of interaction. The growing interest and wave of
scholarship on the subject is a strong indication in that regard, even though this is often
overlookedby themainstream literature on international lawand international relations,
as has been observed by Jonathan Fox.96 This author strongly believes, however, that if
international law is to achieve its aim of developing ‘‘a legal framework that emphasizes
our common humanity and dignity’’ in today’s world, then ‘‘international lawyers [and
scholars] can no longer afford to ignore the importance that religion plays for many
individuals and many societies’’,97 simply because it can be predicted that it will
continue to play that role in the future.
It would be for the benefit of both religion and international law and for the
enhancement of our common humanity, if we all, as human agents of both systems,
strive to promote a friendly and harmonistic relationship between the two systems
rather than a belligerent or adversarial one.We can achieve this by not downplaying the
areas of difference between the two systems, but rather by accentuating those areas of
common ground. We must also be committed to resolving the possible areas of tension
with good faith and with the principal aim of promoting global peace and stability.
This is not impossible if we adopt the principle that ‘‘everything can be discussed’’. I
picked up this phrase from one of my hosts during a recent visit to Malaysia. In trying
to resolve an argument, he said ‘‘don’t worry, everything can be discussed’’. It struck
me immediately that this was the best principle for resolving differences. Certainly,
with good faith ‘‘everything can be discussed’’, including the areas of tension between
religion and international law. This becomes even easierwherewefirst acknowledge and
accentuate the many areas of common ground between the two systems. That is where
this author’s main contribution in this field has been, with research outputs promoting
and emphasising the possibility of a harmonistic relationship between international law,
international human rights law and Islamic law, particularly in Muslim states. It seems
that this approach is increasingly being appreciated by other scholars on the subject as
well as policy-makers and relevant institutions.
95 A.A. An-Na’im, ‘‘The Best of Times and the Worst of Times: Human Agency and Human
Rights in Islamic Societies’’ (2004) 1(1) Muslim World Journal of Human Rights, Article 5, p.2.
96 J. Fox, ‘‘Religion as an Overlooked Element of International Relations’’ (2001) 3 International
Studies Review 53.
97 Janis and Evans (eds), Religion and International Law (2004), p.vii.
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